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Abstract 
Financial contagion is often observed in recent financial crisis, which illustrates a critical need 
for new and fundamental understanding of its dynamics. So in this paper we mainly focus on 
modeling and analysing the financial contagion in a system where a large number of financial 
institutions are randomly connected by the direct balance sheets linkages own to the lending or 
borrowing relationships. We propose a simple contagion algorithm to study the effect of 
several determinants, such as the topology of financial network, exposure ratio, leverage ratio, 
and the liquidation ratio. One of our finding is that the financial contagion is weaker as the 
growth of connectivity of network, so a financial system with a higher connectivity is more 
stability or robustness; we also find that the exposure ratio increases the risk of financial 
contagion, but both the leverage ratio and liquidation ratio has a negative relationship on 
financial contagion.  
Keywords: Financial Contagion, contagion algorithm, Financial System, Random Network, 
Financial stability, Systemic Risk. 
Introduction  
A crucial characteristic for the recent financial crisis is the contagion (or avalanche effect) of 
distress/failure, which is the potential of shocks hitting particular financial institutions to 
quickly spread across the whole financial system. For example, the default of Lehman 
Brothers on 15 September 2008, triggers a series of bankruptcy of firms in the financial 
system of USA, even in other countries. Many economists are attracted by this contagion 
phenomenon and produce a wealth of studies. Particularly, the using of network theory is the 
prominent direction. Indeed, the financial system can be viewed as a network with highly 
connected structure by interdependencies because of financial innovation—those 
interdependencies can be in the form of obligation, exposure, ownership and correlation [1]. 
Building on these interdependencies, the intertwined financial network and the diversified 
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financial institution can not only offer an explanation for the spread of crisis throughout the 
network, but also offer an implication for policy actions such as government intervention and 
bailout. These interdependent relationships, initially build-up with the purpose of risk sharing, 
have also created a channel of spreading of financial distress. Like what [2] said, the financial 
network exhibits a knife-edge, or robust-yet-fragile property: in normal times the 
interdependencies between institutions enhance the liquidity allocation and increased risk 
sharing[3]; however, in financial distress time, the same interdependencies can amplify initial 
shocks lead to the insolvency of a large number of institutions or even the collapse of the 
whole network [4, 5]. 
However, the study of the nature and causes of financial contagion reflects the uncertainty 
and conflicting views from the academic literatures. For example, in the paper of [3] and [6], 
the authors argue that with the financial network becoming more dense, the impact of shocks 
of individual institutions to the rest system is becoming small, as the losses of an distressed 
individual bank are divided into more creditors, However, In contrast to this view, Blume, 
Easley et al.[7] and Vivier-Lirimont [8] argue that the frangibility of a financial network is 
increase when the number of the counterparties of a bank is growing. This situation illustrates 
a critical need for new and fundamental understanding and analysis of financial contagion. So 
in this paper we mainly focus on modeling and analysing the financial contagion in a financial 
system where a large number of financial institutions are connected by the direct balance 
sheets linkages own to the lending or borrowing relationships. In this financial network an 
institution interacts with serval other institutions, and so the default of one institution as some 
idiosyncratic shocks will affect its creditors, the creditors which are insolvent will also suffer 
default and cause further failures in the financial system. A number of determinants influence 
this kind of financial contagion, such as the topology of financial network, the size of 
exposures, and the capital buffer. We model this kind of financial contagion and propose a 
simple contagion algorithm to study the role of these determinants. In detail, focusing on a 
financial system with n banks randomly connected, we take the initial idiosyncratic shock as 
exogenous, and investigate and analyse how it spreads through different financial networks; 
we also study how it is absorbed or amplified by different size of exposures and the capital 
buffer. Our contribution is to the ongoing debate on the role of financial integration and 
diversification in the spreading of financial contagion. 
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review 
of relevant literature on the application of network theory to the study of financial contagion; 
Section 3 introduces the contagion mechanism and the algorithm; Section 4 presents the 
results of simulation experiments; Section 5 concludes. 
Literature Review 
Even financial crises have been frequently witnessed throughout the twentieth century, it is in 
recent times, following the global financial collapse as the Subprime Crisis of 2008-2009, that 
the network theory have been extensively employed to study financial contagion by 
economists and financial regulators [9-11]. The seminal literature of [3] pioneer this strand of 
theoretical study by showing how the network structure affects the risk sharing, they point out 
that the complete network can absorb idiosyncratic shocks, while the complete network might 
allow negative spillovers to spread throughout the system (financial contagion). After this 
outstanding work, a large number of literatures on financial contagion employ network or 
graph model. Financial contagion mainly comes through three mechanisms: 1), correlation 
risk because of overlapping portfolios exposure [12-15]; 2) liquidity hoarding risk because of 
rumor or imperfect information [5, 16, 17]; and 3), counterparty risk because of the direct 
bilateral exposures[9, 18-21]. We mainly focus on the third mechanism in which the bilateral 
exposures are the direct balance sheets linkages in the form of lending or borrowing 
relationships. Indeed, these lending or borrowing relationships can be act as a channel of 
spreading of contagion. 
We broadly categorize the study of financial contagion into two branches, the first branch 
is considering financial system as random network, which emphasize the importance of 
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network topology structure, such as network connectivity, average degree and density. Those 
kinds of literatures model financial contagion as a result from an initial idiosyncratic shock to 
one or few financial institutions and spreading through the entire network in a cascade manner. 
This group of literatures includes the work of [4, 9, 18, 19, 22]. The other branch is studying 
the financial contagion in a deterministic network, which considers the financial network as 
either exogenous or endogenous and examines the impact of initial defaults as predetermined 
by network externalities, such as the configuration model[23], the tiering banking 
network[24], nested split graph[25]. 
The above mentioned theoretical literatures investigate the mechanism and influence of 
financial contagion under a series of determinants by some stylized model and a series of 
assumptions. There is an obvious shortcoming of such brands of research, as what Upper said: 
“analytical results on the relationship between market structure and contagion have been 
obtained only for a limited number of highly stylized structures of interbank markets, which 
are of limited use when it comes to assessing the scope for contagion in real world banking 
systems”[26]. “Given the scarcity of theoretical results, researchers have increasingly turned 
to computer simulations to study contagion”, actually, Upper presents an comprehensive 
review on using numerical simulations to study the mechanics of financial contagion in the 
paper of[27]. Here we also list some paper on simulation in recent year, [5, 9, 12, 18, 19, 28-
35]. 
Financial Network and Balance Sheet  
Here we consider a financial system in which n financial institutions (banks for short) are 
randomly connected together by their exposures on each other. These exposures which reflect 
the lending or borrowing relationships in this financial system can be represented by a 
weighted directed network, denoted by an exposure matrix𝐖 ∈ ℝ𝐧×𝐧. In this network, each 
node is a bank and each link represents a directional lending relationship between two banks, 
the weight reflects the size of exposure which comprises assets as well as liabilities on other 
side. We should highlight that the magnitude of these exposures is important for study 
financial contagion. The exposure matrix W is defined as follow, where 𝒘𝒊𝒋 denotes the size 
of lending by Bank i to bank j, ( 𝒊, 𝒋 ∈ 𝑵, 𝑵 = {𝟏, 𝟐, … , 𝒏}), 𝒘𝒊𝒋 ≠ 𝟎 reflects the presence of a 
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Now we turn to consider the structure of assets and liabilities for individual bank. Figure 
1 shows a stylized balance sheet for a financial institution. On the assets side of figure 1, the 
bank lends to other banks in the financial system, which form the “Internal Assets”, the 
remainder of assets consists a range of “External Assets” which are the holdings of other real 
economy, such as government bonds, mortgages, corporate lending and commercial real 
estate lending. On the other side of the balance sheet, the liabilities consists of the “Deposits” 
and “Internal Liabilities”, the deposits is held to be external outside of the system, as such 
household, internal liabilities is the borrowing from other banks, the “Equity” is the capital 
buffer which denotes the excess of total assets over total liabilities. 
Considering the exposure matrix W, we can calculate the total exposures of bank i to the 
financial system. The “Internal Assets” held by i, which is denoted by 𝑨𝒊
𝑰 , can be got based 
on 𝑨𝒊
𝑰 = ∑ 𝒘𝒊𝒋𝒋 ; and The “Internal Liabilities” 𝑳𝒊
𝑰 can be got based on 𝑳𝒊
𝑰 = ∑ 𝒘𝒋𝒊𝒋  . 












Fig. 1. Stylized Balance Sheet for a Financial Institution (Bank) 
Since an internal asset of one bank is an internal liability of another bank, so the internal 
liabilities are endogenously determined based on the topology of the financial network, 







= 𝑺                      (𝟏) 
We define the total of internal assets as S, which provide a measure of the total risk 
exposures of the financial system. Considering the structure of balance sheet, the following 
equations are found. 
𝑨𝒊 = 𝑨𝒊
𝑬 + 𝑨𝒊
𝑰                                        (𝟐) 
𝑳𝒊 = 𝑳𝒊
𝑰 + 𝑫𝒊 + 𝑬𝒊                                 (𝟑) 
𝑨𝒊 = 𝑳𝒊                                                   (𝟒) 
Where 𝑨𝒊, 𝑳𝒊, 𝑨𝒊
𝑬, 𝑫𝒊 and 𝑬𝒊 denote bank i’s total assets, total liabilities, external assets, 
deposits and equity, respectively.  
What’s more, we introduce two ratios. The exposure ratio, which denotes as 𝜶𝒊, is the rate 
of internal assets to the total assets ( 𝜶𝒊 = 𝑨𝒊
𝑰 𝑨𝒊⁄ ) The exposure ratio reflects the risk 
exposures of bank i; The leverage ratio, which denotes as 𝜷𝒊, is the rate of equity to total 
assets (𝜷𝒊 = 𝑬𝒊 𝑨𝒊⁄ ), this leverage ratio is also named as “capital ratio” or “the ratio of net 
worth”, which represents the capacity of absorbing losses while remaining solvent. As we 
mentioned, the “Equity” is the excess of total assets over total liabilities, so when the total 
liabilities exceed the total assets (𝐄𝐢 ≤ 𝟎 𝐨𝐫 𝛃𝐢 ≤ 𝟎), the bank insolvent. 
The Contagion Mechanism 
Initial Failures 
Here we assume that the initial failures are caused by idiosyncratic shock which happed due 
to some credit risks (e.g., frauds) or operation risks (e.g., wrong decision). The idiosyncratic 
shock has a bad effect on the external assets of a subset of banks in the financial system 
(maybe one or serval banks), in the form of reducing the amount of external assets and hence 
causing the default of these banks. It is worth noting that the idiosyncratic shock is not the 
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aggregated or correlated shock which influence almost all banks simultaneously in the 
financial system. The bank has to liquidate if it is default, while its creditors will lose a 
fraction of claims because the liquidation value of a firm is always smaller than its book value. 
Formal speaking, a bank i is insolvent when 𝑬𝒊 ≤ 𝟎 because of the reduction of external 
assets, which cause the bank to liquidate; the liquidation of bank i induces a loss equal to 
𝜸𝒊𝒘𝒋𝒊 for its counterparty j, where 𝜸𝒊 is the liquidation ratio of bank i. So we define the set of 
initially insolvent banks is as follow: 
𝒁𝟎 = {𝒊 ∈ 𝑵| 𝜷𝒊 ≤ 𝟎 }                          (𝟓) 
In this paper, we study the case that the number of set 𝒁𝟎 equal one, which means there is 
just one default bank at initial time. 
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Fig. 2. The contagion mechanism 
In this financial network, the default of one or several banks may lead to other banks being 
insolvency, which generating a cascade effect of default. Figure 2 illustrates the mechanism 
of the cascade effect. At some time of this contagion process, bank A and bank B are 
insolvent and have to be liquidated, which lead to repay their internal liabilities to bank 1, 2, 
3,…,m. Each creditor bank only receive one proportion of its claims, this induce bank 1 
suffering a loss which exceed its equity, so bank 1 become insolvent and is to be liquidated in 
the subsequent step; besides, bank 3 also become insolvent because that the cumulative losses, 
incurred from both bank A and bank B, exceed its equity. It must be worth to note that bank A 
and B are not necessary to be liquidated in the same step. 
To model the dynamics of default contagion, we suppose that all banks in the network are 
initially solvent and that the network is perturbed at time T=0 by the initial failure of one 
single bank. Considering the set of initially insolvent banks 𝒁𝟎, we calculate the set of banks, 
which become insolvent at time T=1 due to their claims to initial default bank, based on the 
following equations. 
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𝒛𝟏 = {𝒊 ∈ 𝑵| 𝑬𝒊 ≤ ∑ (𝟏 − 𝜸𝒋)𝒘𝒊𝒋
𝒋∈𝒁𝟎
 }           (𝟔) 
𝒁𝟏 = 𝒁𝟎 ∪  𝒛𝟏                                                   (𝟕) 
Actually, when introduce the initial failure, for bank i, which is not in the set of 𝒁𝟎, the 
internal assets 𝑨𝒊
𝑰 = ∑ 𝜸𝒋𝒘𝒊𝒋𝒋∈𝒁𝟎 + ∑ 𝒘𝒊𝒋𝒋∉𝒁𝟎 , so the change of internal assets △ 𝑨𝒊
𝑰 =
∑ (𝟏 − 𝜸𝒋)𝒘𝒊𝒋𝒋∈𝒁𝟎  . According to equation (2), (3), (4), we can obtain that bank i will be 
insolvent when 𝑬𝒊 ≤ ∆𝑨𝒊
𝑰. 
Following this procedure, we can calculate the set of default banks at time T=t based on 
𝒁𝒕−𝟏. 
𝒛𝒕 = {𝒊 ∈ 𝑵| 𝑬𝒊 ≤ ∑ (𝟏 − 𝜸𝒋)𝒘𝒊𝒋
𝒋∈𝒁𝒕−𝟏
 }           (𝟖) 
𝒁𝒕 = 𝒁𝒕−𝟏 ∪  𝒛𝒕                                                   (𝟗) 
Iterating the equation of 8 and 9, we can trace the contagion process initialed by one 
single bank (#𝒁𝟎 = 𝟏). The process will terminate when 𝒁𝒕 = 𝒁𝒕−𝟏.  
A Simple Contagion Algorithm  
This contagion process can be study by the tool of branching process which is widely used in 
the field of epidemiology for study the epidemic spreading[36]. Indeed there are some 
scholars adopt the branching process to study the probability of financial contagion or the 
extent of contagion [4]. However, there are several challenges for the theoretical analysis of 
financial contagion. Firstly, the structures of balance sheet for banks are diversity. The size of 
total assets, the leverage ratio, the exposures ratio and the in-degree and out-degree for 
different bank may be different. Secondly, the branching process usually occurs on a tree, but 
the financial contagion not necessarily a tree, but is rather a more general graph. Take the 
default of bank 3 as we illustrate in figure 2 as example. The default of either bank A or bank 
B will not induce the default of bank 3, but the default of both bank A and bank B can induce 
its default. Considering these challenges, we turn to simulation study of financial contagion 
with the following contagion algorithm. 
Step 1: Introducing the initial failures. Random selecting one bank for default, so the size 
of the set of initially insolvent banks equal one (#𝒁𝟎 = 𝟏); 
Step 2: Liquidating the default bank. Only repaying one proportional of internal liabilities 
for the default bank (𝜸𝒊𝒘𝒋𝒊); 
Step 3: Revising banks’ balance sheets. Mainly focusing on the creditors for default banks 
and revising these creditors’ balance sheets based on equations (2), (3), (4); 
Step 4: Updating the set of default banks. Calculating the set of default banks Zt based on 
equations (8), (9). 
Step 5: Terminating this algorithm if 𝒁𝒕 = 𝒁𝒕−𝟏, otherwise returning to step 2. 
Simulation Experiments and Results 
Parameters Setting 
The algorithm mentioned above makes it possible to study the contagion process in a financial 
system when it is in a particular state, corresponding to a particular configuration of the 
network topology and the balance sheets for each bank. Our main goals are to understand 
whether and how the financial contagion depends on the network properties and the structure 
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of balance sheets. At the first step, we should make some specific instruction for the network 
topology and balance sheets.  
Table 1. Summary of the variation for parameters 




N The number of nodes in a financial network 1000(fixed) 
𝑷𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒎 The probability of forming a link between two nodes 0.01 to 0.30 
Balance Sheet Structure 
𝜶 The exposure ratio/the internal-assets-to-assets ratio 0.2 to 0.4 
𝜷 The leverage ratio/ the equity-to assets ratio 0.01 to 0.05 
The liquidation ratio 
𝜸 The repaying ratio for each internal liabilities 0 to 0.4 
The financial network be studied is Erdös and Rényi random graph[37]. The random 
graph model can be defined by two parameters: N disconnected nodes and the probability P 
for forming a link between each couple of nodes, the link formation process is i.i.d. and the 
degree distribution is binomial. Based on this definition, we can construct a series of financial 
systems which comprises 1000 banks, the lending or borrowing relationships in the financial 
system is represented by the weight in the network, the weight is assigned according to the 
discovery of the paper of [38], in which the weight follows a Log-Normal distribution with 
mean 15.2 and standard deviation of 0.8. 
Now turn to the structure of balance sheet, we assume that all banks have the same 
exposures and leverage in a financial network, but difference in different networks. So in a 
financial network, we set the exposure ratio and leverage ratio for all banks are the same 𝜶 
and 𝜷, respectively. We can determine the detail information for each bank’s balance sheet, 
such as, total assets, equity and deposits, based on the confirming of internal assets , internal 
liabilities 𝜶 and 𝜷. 
In a nutshell, a financial system is determined by the matrix W, exposure ratio α and 
leverage ratio 𝜷. So the diversification of the financial system is reflected by the variation of 
these parameters. Table 1 summary these variation which are considered in our simulation 
study. It is worth noting that we also assume that all banks in the same financial system have 
the same liquidation ratio. 
Finally, in order to evaluate the magnitude of financial contagion, we introduce two 
measure indicators. At first, we define financial contagion as an event that at least one bank 
falls into default as a response to the initial failure. Following this definition, two measure 
indicators are derived: 1), contagion probability, defined as the probability of occurring of a 
contagion event (equation 10); 2), extent of contagion, defined as the average banks being 
defaulted induced by the initial failure if a contagion event occurs (equation 11). The 
contagion probability and the extent of contagion are suitable for measuring the magnitude of 
financial contagion, reflecting the stability or the robustness of a financial system. Particularly, 
contagion probability reflects the sensibility of a financial system for suffering financial 
contagion, while the extent of contagion reflects the fragility of a financial system. In the 
following subsections, we present the computational results which are performed 1000 
simulations based on these two measure indicators. 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 =
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔
   (15)  
𝑬𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 =
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒂𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅
       (𝟏𝟔)  
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The Probability P and Contagion 
We first investigate the effect of probability P, which denotes the probability of forming link 
between each couple of nodes when constructing a financial network. Figure 3 shows the 
changing of the contagion probability and extent of contagion under the varying of the 
probability P, here we also vary the leverage ratio 𝜷 from 0.01 to 0.05. Our first finding is 
that both the contagion probability and the extent of contagion decrease as the increasing of 
probability P, regardless of the varying of 𝜷 . Especially, there is a sharp drop when 
probability P varying approximately from 0.05 to 0.2. Moreover, considering the same 
probability P, we observe that a higher value of leverage ratio 𝜷, the lower value for the 
contagion probability as well as the extent of contagion. These observations show the 
negative influence of the probability P and leverage ratio 𝜷 on the financial contagion. 
 
Fig. 3. The influence of probability P on financial contagion 
This negative relationship between probability P and financial contagion can be 
understand as follow: for a random network, the average degree is approximately (𝑵 − 𝟏)𝑷. 
So the average degree is increase as the growing of the probability P, which reflects a higher 
level of connectivity of the network; the high level of connectivity denotes the shock of 
defaulted banks can be shared or absorbed by more banks, so the contagion probability and 
the extent of contagion are small. We conclude that a higher value of probability P, which 
denotes the financial system is more stability, the lower probability of contagion and the 
lower of the extent of contagion. Turn to the negative relationship between leverage ratio 𝜷 
and financial contagion, the intuition is simple: higher value of leverage ratio 𝜷  reflects 
higher capital buffer which act as a cushion, this situation denotes that banks can absorb more 
risk induced by other banks. This also leads us to conclude that the financial system with high 
leverage ratio is more robustness, because of the negative influence on financial contagion. 
 Exposure Ratio and Contagion 
Figure 4 reports the effect of exposure ratio on financial contagion. We find that both the 
contagion probability and the extent of contagion increase as the growing of exposure ratio, 
for example, when leverage ratio 𝜷  equals 0.03, the contagion probability is changing 
approximately from 0.18 to 0.67, and the extent of contagion is changing from 0 to 400. The 
probable reason is following: the increasing of exposure ratio reflects the growing of risk for 
banks, because high exposure ratio denotes more assets are hold by other banks. From another 
perspective, the exposure ratio measures the concentration of bank’s asset, higher exposure 
ratio reflects lower concentration, so induce higher influence on it when failure hits the banks’ 
counterparty.  








































































Fig. 4. The influence of exposure ratio on financial contagion 
However, there are two special cases. The first case is the situation that the leverage ratio 
𝜷 equals 0.01, the contagion probability is always 1 and the extent of contagion is almost 100,  
although the exposure ratio is varying from 0.2 to 0.4, the reason is that the financial network 
is so fragile that can’t bear any shocks because of low leverage ratio. The other case is that the 
leverage ratio 𝜷 equals 0.04 or 0.05, although there is a distinct changing for the contagion 
probability, the extent of contagion has almost no changings, this situation induces that the 
financial contagion can occur but the extent is very small. The underlying reason is obvious, 
the high leverage ratio denotes the high level of stability of the financial network, which 
reflects the initial idiosyncratic shock can be absorbed during the first few contagion process. 
 Liquidation Ratio and Contagion 
We finally investigate the effect of liquidation ratio on financial contagion. The liquidation 
ratio reflects the repaying proportion for internal liabilities when bank needs to liquidate. The 
liquidation ratio also can be considered as a measure of the magnitude of the shocks: a higher 
liquidation ratio, the lower magnitude of the shock, because high liquidation ratio reflects 
more internal liabilities can be repaid.  
Figure 5 shows the changing of the contagion probability and extent of contagion under 
the varying of the liquidation ratio. We can find that both the contagion probability and extent 
of contagion decrease due to the increasing of liquidation ratio. As discussed above, the 
reason is that high liquidation denotes the magnitude of shock is small, so the financial 
contagion can’t spread further. Of course, there are also two special cases, one is that the 
financial system is fragile when the leverage ratio 𝜷  equals 0.01, where the contagion 
probability and the extent of contagion are almost 1 and 1000, respectively; the other is the 
situation that financial system is stability when leverage ratio 𝜷 equals 0.04 or 0.05, where the 
extent of contagion is almost zero.  
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Fig.5. The influence of liquidation ratio on financial contagion 
Discussion and Conclusion  
Indeed, during the past few decades, global financial systems have seen considerable growth 
in size, complexity and diversification. However, it is our understanding of the mechanism of 
such systems that has not necessarily kept pace. On the other hand, the recent financial crisis 
has made a profound demonstration that modern financial systems can amplify and 
disseminate financial distress on a global scale. Motivated these situations, in this paper we 
analyse how the topology of financial network and the balance sheet structure affect financial 
contagion, which is evaluated by the contagion probability and the extent of contagion, by 
simulation study based on a simple contagion algorithm. We find that the financial contagion 
is weaker as the growth of connectivity of the network in the form of increasing probability P, 
a high level of connectivity denotes the shock of defaulted banks can be shared or absorbed 
by more counterparties, so a financial system with a higher probability P is more stability or 
robustness. For the structure of balance sheet which is determined by exposure ratio α and 
leverage ratio 𝜷 , we find that exposure ratio has a positive relationship with financial 
contagion, but a negative relationship for leverage ratio and financial contagion. The exposure 
ratio measures the concentration of bank’s asset, higher exposure ratio reflects lower 
concentration, this situation induces that bank exposes more risk to its counterparty. The 
leverage ratio determines the magnitude of bank’s capital buffer which reflects the capacity of 
absorbing shocks. Finally we investigates the role of liquidation ratio, which evaluates the 
magnitude of the shocks, on financial contagion, the results show that both the contagion 
probability and extent of contagion decrease due to the increasing of liquidation ratio. 
Our study partly clarifies the interplay between the network topology and financial 
integration in the disseminating financial contagion. Besides, this study also provides 
implications for regulation of financial system. For example, the regulation of financial 
stability should not only seek to minimize the risk of failure of individual institutions, but also 
should focus on the whole financial system. In detail, the strategy of diversification indeed 
looks like sensible for sharing risk from the perspective of individual institutions—eggs are 
placed in more baskets; however the diversification may not optimal being viewed from 
systemic perspective, even can generate a bad result. 
However, some factors are not taken into account in this study. For a financial network, 
we assume that banks are randomly connected, but this may be not true in reality, because 
banks lend or borrow money depend on many factors, such as bank’s credit. So the network 
topology may be not determined by random connection, for example, Chinazzi, Fagiolo et al 
find a core-periphery structure of the International Financial Network (IFN) architecture [39]. 
Of course, the exposure ratio and leverage ratio also may be not the same for all banks. Those 


































































factors should be investigated in our future study, what’s more, other interesting problems are 
also worth to study, such as how the role of governmental intervention and bailout under 
financial crisis, how to response for individual institution to mitigate contagion and so on. 
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